I. Why Ethics?
In 2001, the most authoritative scientific report on climate change, from the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 1 began by saying: Natural, technical, and social sciences can provide essential information and evidence needed for decisions on what constitutes "dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system." At the same time, such decisions are value judgments. 2 There are good grounds for this statement. Climate change is complex problem raising issues across and between a large number of disciplines, including the physical and life sciences, political science, economics, and psychology, to name just a few. But without wishing for a moment to (p.20) marginalize the contributions of these disciplines, ethics does seem to play a fundamental role.
Why so? At the most general level, the reason is that we cannot get very far in discussing why climate change is a problem without invoking ethical considerations. If we do not think that our own actions are open to moral assessment, or that various interests-our own; those of our kith, kin, and country; those of distant people, future people, animals, and nature-matter, then it is hard to see why climate change (or much else) poses a problem. But once we see this, then we appear to need some account of moral responsibility, morally important interests, and what to do about both. This puts us squarely in the domain of ethics.
At a more practical level, ethical questions are fundamental to the main policy decisions that must be made, such as where to set a global ceiling for greenhouse gas emissions, and how to distribute the emissions permitted by such a ceiling. Consider first where the global ceiling is set at a particular time. In large part, this depends on how the interests of the present are weighed against those of the future. As the IPCC said in its 2007 report: "Choices about the scale and timing of [greenhouse gas] mitigation involve balancing the economic costs of more rapid emission reductions now against the corresponding medium-term and long-term climate risks of delay." 3 One way of making this point vivid is to imagine an extreme case. Suppose that the president of the United States went on television tonight and said that he and other world leaders were declaring a global state of emergency and ordering an immediate radical cut in emissions (e.g., complete cessation, or an 80% cut). Such a cut would dramatically reduce the risks to future generations of catastrophic impacts from climate change. Still, the proposal is surely unreasonable and unethical. Since the global economic system-on which most people's way of life depends-is substantially driven by fossil fuels, an immediate radical cut in emissions would cause a social and economic catastrophe for current people. Since there is no way that the system could cope with an overnight change of this magnitude, such a policy would probably lead to mass starvation, rampant disease, and war. Civil society would collapse. Even if this did "solve" the climate problem for future generations, the moral objections to such an approach would be overwhelming.
(p.21) The instant radical cut strategy is thus not discussed, and for good reason. Nevertheless, the prospect raises important questions. Suppose, for the sake of argument, that such a cut would be what is best for future people. 4 For example, suppose that it would be awful for those living through it, but that at some point later generations would be better off than under any alternative climate policy, and at least as well off as we are now. If such an option were available, the question would become: how far are current people entitled to inflict risks on the future in order to protect themselves? If the threat to the present were imminent and widespread social collapse, it seems that they are so entitled. But what if it were not? What if, instead, the cost facing the current generation were merely a slightly lower standard of living than they are currently used to? Moreover, what if this were necessary to save the future from a genuine catastrophe? The crucial thought here is that presumably at some point the interests of future people become so important, and those of current people relatively less so, that the balance tips to the future. This is relevant because a decision on where to set a global cap at a particular time implicitly answers the question of where we think this tipping point is. Of course, even without an explicit cap, our actual behavior-the emissions we allow at a particular time-also implicitly answers the question. At the time of writing, this answer is very strongly in our favor. Indeed, it suggests the view that our interests have absolute priority over the interests of the future: any interest of ours (however trivial) is sufficient to outweigh any interest of theirs (however serious).
Consider now the second main policy issue: once a global cap for a particular time is set, how do we decide how emissions are to be distributed under it? This is a very important question. Given that fossil fuel consumption is currently fundamental to our economic systems and likely to remain important for decades, even as we transition towards alternatives, how we answer the question of who is allowed to emit how much will have major social, economic, and geopolitical consequences. But many of the issues underlying any answer are ethical. Any allocation must (explicitly or implicitly) take a position on the importance of factors such as historical responsibility for the problem, the current needs and future aspirations of particular societies, and the appropriate (p.22) role of energy consumption in people's lives. Consider the following. Does it matter that the developed nations are responsible for the overwhelming majority of emissions historically? 5 Is it important that their populations are, on average, much richer than those of the less developed nations, and likely to remain so during the transition? 6 What are we to say about the fact that some people's emissions are largely "spent" on luxury items (such as maintaining large houses at a constant temperature of 72 degrees F, or driving large and relatively energy-inefficient vehicles, or taking exotic vacations far from home) whereas others are the basis of bare subsistence? 7 The relevance of ethics to substantive climate policy thus seems clear, and the topic deserves serious independent treatment. This is a project to which I have contributed elsewhere. 8 Still, it is not my focus in this book. Instead, I address a further-and to some extent more basic-way in which ethical reflection sheds light on our present predicament. This has nothing much to do with the substance of a defensible climate regime; instead, it concerns the making of climate policy.
My thesis is this. The peculiar features of the climate change problem pose substantial obstacles to our ability to make the hard choices necessary to address it. Climate change is a perfect moral storm. One consequence of this is that, even if the difficult ethical questions could be answered, we might still find it difficult to act. For the storm makes us extremely vulnerable to moral corruption. 9 Let us say that a perfect storm is an event constituted by an unusual convergence of independently harmful factors where this convergence is likely to result in substantial, and possibly catastrophic, negative (p.23) outcomes. The term "the perfect storm" seems to have become prominent in popular culture from Sebastian Junger's book of that name, and the associated film. 10 Junger's tale is based on the true story of the Andrea Gail, a fishing vessel caught at sea during a convergence of three particularly bad storms. The sense of the analogy is that climate change appears to be a perfect moral storm because it involves the convergence of a number of factors that threaten our ability to behave ethically. 11 As climate change is a complex phenomenon, I cannot hope to identify all of the ways in which its features cause problems for ethical behavior. 12 Instead, I will identify three especially salient problems -analogous to the three storms that hit the Andrea Gail -that converge in the climate change case. These three "storms" arise in the global, intergenerational, and theoretical dimensions, and I will argue that their interaction helps to exacerbate and obscure a lurking problem of moral corruption that may be of greater practical importance than any one of them.
(p.24) II. The Global Storm
The climate challenge is usually understood in spatial, and especially geopolitical, terms. We can make sense of this by pointing out three important characteristics of the problem: dispersion of causes and effects, fragmentation of agency, and institutional inadequacy.
The Basic Storm
Let us begin with the dispersion of causes and effects. Climate change is a truly global phenomenon. Emissions of greenhouse gases from any geographical location on the earth's surface enter the atmosphere and then play a role in affecting climate globally. Hence, the impact of any particular emission of greenhouse gases is not realized solely at its source, either individual or geographical; instead, impacts are dispersed to other actors and regions of the earth. Such spatial dispersion has been widely discussed.
The second characteristic is fragmentation of agency. Climate change is not caused by a single agent, but by a vast number of individuals and institutions (including economic, social, and political institutions) not unified by a comprehensive structure of agency. This is important because it poses a challenge to humanity's ability to respond. In the spatial dimension, this feature is usually understood as arising out of the shape of the current international system, as constituted by states. Then the problem is that, given that there is not only no world government but also no less centralized system of global governance (or at least no effective one), it is very difficult to coordinate an effective response to global climate change.
This general argument is typically given more bite through the invocation of a certain familiar theoretical model. 13 For the international situation is usually understood in game theoretic terms as a prisoner's dilemma, or what Garrett Hardin calls a tragedy of the commons. Let us (p.25) consider each of these models in turn (see also chapters 3 and 4). (The details of the next few paragraphs can be safely overlooked by those uninterested in more technical matters.).) A prisoner's dilemma is a situation with a certain structure. 14 In the standard example, two prisoners are about to stand trial for a crime that they are accused of committing together. 15 Each faces the following proposition. He can either confess or not confess. If both confess, then each gets five years. If neither confesses, then each gets one year on a lesser charge. But if one confesses and the other does not, then the confessor goes free, and the nonconfessor gets ten years. Neither knows for sure what the other will do; but each knows that the other faces the same choice situation.
Given this scenario, each person has the following preference ranking: The reason why the situation is called a dilemma is as follows. Suppose I am one of the prisoners. I cannot guarantee what the other prisoner will do, and I lack any effective means to make it that I can do so. So I need to consider each possibility. Suppose he confesses. Then it is better for me to confess also (since 5 years in jail is better than 10). Suppose he does not confess. Then it is better for me to confess (since going free is better than 1 year in jail). So, whatever he does, I should confess. (p.26) Unfortunately, the situation is exactly the same for him. So, reasoning in the same way I do, he will also confess. This means that the outcome will be that both of us confess (getting 5 years each). But this is suboptimal: each of us prefers the outcome that comes from us both not confessing (1 year each) over the outcome that comes from us both confessing (5 years The tragedy of the commons model is perhaps more familiar in environmental contexts than the prisoner's dilemma, but seems to have the same underlying logic. In essentials, the tragedy of the commons appears to be a prisoner's dilemma involving a single common resource. (I offer a more complex account of the relationship between the two models in chapter 4.) In his classic example, Hardin imagines a group of herdsmen grazing their cattle on common land. Each herdsman is considering whether or not he should add to his herd. Hardin assumes that the relevant factors to consider are: on the positive side, the benefit of an extra cow, which is roughly the price it will fetch in the market place; and, on (p.27) the negative side, the effects of this cow's grazing on what is left for other animals. But, he observes, these benefits and costs are distributed differently: whereas the benefit accrues only to the individual herdsman, the costs are spread across all the cattle in the pasture, and so are shared by all herdsmen. 17 Suppose then that each herdsman has as his goal the maximization of his own profit. Given the distribution of costs and benefits, each will find himself with a strong incentive to add extra cattle; and so all will. But if they do, this will result in the systematic overgrazing of the commons, which is disastrous for everyone.
The force of Hardin's example is as follows. The situation facing the herdsmen is paradoxical. On the one hand, each prefers the outcome of everyone restricting their own herd (i.e., the commons remaining intact) over the outcome produced by no one doing so (i.e., the collapse of the commons towards an outcome that is worse by their own lights, and away from one that is better. Indeed, it is the very same values that make cooperation preferable that drive each agent away from it. In Hardin's example, each herdsman wants the maximum profit, which is why all prefer collective constraint; still, when they act as individuals, it is their desire for profit that drives them to pursue more (and more) cattle, and so leads to the collapse of the commons. 18 The basic features of the herdsmen example can be generalized to fit other cases in the same way as those of the prisoner's dilemma. Roughly speaking, the tragedy of the commons holds when: (TC1) each agent prefers the outcome produced by everyone restricting their consumption over the outcome produced by no one doing so; but (TC2) each agent has the power to decide whether or not she will restrict her consumption, each (rationally) prefers not to do so, whatever the others do. Again, this (p.28) is paradoxical: according to the first claim, each agent accepts that it is collectively rational to cooperate; but, according to the second, each agent believes that it is individually rational not to cooperate. Moreover, if the second claim dominates-if the parties all act on individual rationality-the situation generates tragedy. All are lead to a situation that they agree is worse than another that is potentially available.
The tragedy of the commons has become the standard analytical model for understanding regional and global environmental problems in general, and climate change is no exception. Typically, the reasoning goes as follows. Think of climate change as an international problem, and conceive of the relevant parties as individual countries, who represent the interests of their countries in perpetuity. Then, the above claims about collective and individual rationality appear to hold. On the one hand, no country wants catastrophic climate change. Hence, each prefers the outcome produced by everyone restricting their own emissions over the outcome produced by no one doing so, and so it is collectively rational to cooperate and restrict global emissions. But, on the other hand, each country prefers to free-ride on the actions of others. Hence, when each country has the power to decide whether or not she will restrict her emissions, each prefers not to do so, whatever the others do. 19;
If climate change is a normal tragedy of the commons, this is a matter of concern. Still, there is a sense in which this turns out to be encouraging news. In the real world, commons problems are often resolvable under certain circumstances, and at first glance climate change seems to satisfy these conditions. 20 In particular, it is widely said that parties facing a commons problem can solve it if they benefit from a wider context of interaction-that is, if they have reasons to cooperate with one another over other matters of mutual concern. This appears to be the case with climate change, since countries interact with each other on a number of broader issues, such as trade and security.
This brings us to the third characteristic of the climate change problem, institutional inadequacy. There is wide agreement that the (p.29) appropriate means for resolving commons problems under the favorable conditions just mentioned is for the parties to agree to change the existing incentive structure through the introduction of a system of This transforms the decision situation by foreclosing the option of free-riding, so that the collectively rational action also becomes individually rational. Theoretically, then, matters seem simple; but in practice things are different. The need for enforceable sanctions poses a challenge at the global level because of the limits of our current (largely national) institutions, and the lack of an effective system of global governance. In essence, addressing climate change appears to require global regulation of greenhouse gas emissions, where this includes establishing a reliable enforcement mechanism; but the current global system-or lack of it-makes this difficult, if not impossible.
The implication of the familiar (spatial) analysis, then, is that the main thing needed to solve the climate problem is an effective system of global governance (at least for this issue). There is a sense in which this is still good news. In principle at least, it should be possible to motivate countries to establish such a regime, since they ought to recognize that it is in their long-term interests to eliminate the possibility of free riding and so make genuine cooperation the rational strategy at the individual as well as collective level.
Exacerbating Factors
Unfortunately, however, this is not the end of the story. There are other features of the climate change case that make the necessary global agreement more difficult, and so exacerbate the basic global storm. 22 Prominent amongst these is scientific uncertainty about the precise (p.30) magnitude and distribution of effects, particularly at the national level. 23 One reason for this is that the lack of trustworthy data about the costs and benefits of climate change at the national level casts doubt on the collective rationality claim-that no one wants serious climate change. Perhaps, some nations wonder, we might be better off with at least a moderate amount of climate change than without it. More importantly, some might ask whether, faced with a given serious change, they will at least be relatively better off than other countries, and so might get away with paying less to avoid the associated costs. 24 Such factors complicate the game theoretic situation, and so make agreement more difficult.
In other contexts, the problem of scientific uncertainty might not be so serious. But a second characteristic of the climate problem exacerbates matters in this setting. The source of climate change is located deep in the infrastructure of current civilizations; hence, attempts to combat it may have substantial ramifications for social life. Climate change is caused by human production of greenhouse gases, primarily carbon dioxide. Such emissions are brought about by the burning of fossil fuels for energy. But it is this energy that supports existing economies. Hence, if halting climate change requires deep cuts in projected global emissions over time, we can expect that such action will have profound effects on the basic economic organization of the developed countries and on the aspirations of the developing countries.
The "deep roots" problem has several salient implications. First, it suggests that those with vested interests in the continuation of the current system-for example, many of those who have substantial political and economic power, or who expect to gain such A third and very important feature of the climate change problem that exacerbates the basic global storm is that of skewed vulnerabilities. The climate challenge interacts in some unfortunate ways with the present global power structure. For one thing, the responsibility for historical and current emissions lies predominantly with the richer, more powerful nations, and the poor nations are badly situated to hold them accountable. For another, the limited evidence on regional impacts suggests that it is the poorer nations that are most vulnerable to the worst impacts of climate change, at least in the short-to medium-term. 26 Finally, action on climate change creates a moral risk for the developed nations. Implicitly, it embodies a recognition that there are international norms of ethics and responsibility, and reinforces the idea that international cooperation on issues involving such norms is both possible and necessary. Hence, it may encourage attention to other moral defects of the current global system, such as global poverty and inequality, human rights violations, and so on. If the developed nations are not ready to engage on such topics, this creates a further reason to avoid action on climate change. Indeed, the unwillingness to engage puts pressure on the claim that there is a broader context of interaction within which the climate problem can be solved. If some nations do not wish to engage with (p.32) issues of global ethics, and they believe that creating a climate regime leads down this path, then this lessens the incentive to cooperate. 27
III. The Intergenerational Storm
The global storm emerges from a spatial reading of the characteristics just mentioned (i.e., dispersion of causes and effects, fragmentation of agency, and institutional inadequacy). However, these characteristics are also highly relevant in the temporal dimension, and this gives rise to a more serious, but relatively neglected, challenge. I call this "the intergenerational storm."
The Basic Storm
Consider first the dispersion of causes and effects. Human-induced climate change is a severely lagged phenomenon. This is partly because some of the basic mechanisms set in motion by the greenhouse effect, such as sea level rise, take a very long time to be fully realized. But it is also because by far the most important greenhouse gas produced by human activities is carbon dioxide, and once emitted molecules of carbon dioxide can spend a surprisingly long time in the atmosphere. 28
(p.33) Let us dwell for a moment on this second factor. In the past, the IPCC has said The carbon cycle of the biosphere will take a long time to completely neutralize and sequester anthropogenic CO2. We show a wide range of model forecasts of this effect. For the best-guess cases … we expect that 17-33% of the fossil fuel carbon will still reside in the atmosphere 1kyr from now, decreasing to 10-15% at 10kyr, and 7% at 100 kyr. The fact that carbon dioxide is a long-lived greenhouse gas has at least three important implications. The first is that climate change is a resilient phenomenon. Given that currently it does not seem practical to remove large quantities of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere, or to moderate its climatic effects, the upward trend in atmospheric concentration is not easily reversible. Hence, a goal of stabilizing and then reducing carbon dioxide concentrations requires advance planning. Second, climate change impacts are seriously backloaded. The climate change that the earth is currently experiencing is primarily the result of emissions from some time in the past, rather than current emissions. As an illustration, it is widely accepted that by 2000 we had already committed ourselves to a rise of at least 0.5 and perhaps more than 1 degree Celsius over the thenobserved (p.34) rise of 0.6C. 32 Third, climate change is a substantially deferred phenomenon. Backloading implies that the full, cumulative effects of our current emissions will not be realized for some time in the future.
Temporal dispersion creates a number of problems. First, as is widely noted, the resilience of climate change implies that sustained action across many decades is required, and that this needs to anticipate (and so avoid or moderate) negative impacts that are some way off. Given this, periods of procrastination and vacillation have serious repercussions for our ability to manage the problem. Second, backloading implies that climate change poses serious epistemic difficulties, especially for normal political actors. Backloading makes it hard to grasp the connection between causes and effects, and this may undermine the motivation to act 33 ; it also implies that by the time we realize that things are bad, we will already be committed to much more change, undermining the ability to respond. Third, the deferral effect calls into question the ability of standard institutions to deal with the problem. Democratic political institutions have relatively short time horizons-the next election cycle, a politician's political career-and it is doubtful whether such institutions have the wherewithal to deal with substantially deferred impacts. Even more seriously, substantial deferral is likely to undermine the will to act. This is because there is an incentive problem: the bad effects of current emissions are likely to fall, or fall disproportionately, on future generations, whereas the benefits of emissions accrue largely to the present. 34 These three points already raise the specter of institutional inadequacy. But to appreciate this problem fully, we must first say something about the temporal fragmentation of agency. To begin with, there is some reason to think that this might be worse than spatial fragmentation even considered in isolation. In principle, spatially fragmented agents may actually become unified and so able to act as a single agent; but temporally fragmented agents cannot actually become unified, and so may at best only act as if they were a single agent. Hence, there is a sense in which (p.35) temporal fragmentation may be more intractable than spatial fragmentation. At a minimum, theoretical accounts of how we might act so as to overcome temporal fragmentation seem even more pressing than in the spatial case.
More substantively, the kind of temporal dispersion that characterizes climate change seems clearly much more problematic than the associated spatial fragmentation. Indeed, the presence of backloading and deferral together brings on a new kind of collective action problem that not only adds to the global storm, but is also more difficult to resolve. This problem might aptly be described as one of "intergenerational buck-passing."
We can illustrate the buck-passing problem in the case of climate change if we relax the assumption that countries can be relied upon adequately to represent the interests of both their present and future citizens. Suppose that this is not true. Assume instead that existing national institutions are biased towards the concerns of the current generation: they behave in ways that give excessive weight to those concerns relative to the concerns of future generations. Then, if the benefits of carbon dioxide emission are felt primarily by the present generation 35 (in the form of cheap energy), whereas the costs are substantially deferred to future generations (in the form of the risk of severe and perhaps catastrophic climate change), climate change may provide an instance of a severe intergenerational collective action problem. For one thing, the current generation may "live large" and pass the bill on to the future. For another, the problem may be iterated. As each new generation gains the power to decide whether or not to act, it faces the same incentive structure, and so if it is motivated primarily by generation-relative concerns, it will continue the overconsumption. Thus, the impacts on those generations further into the future are compounded, and more likely to be catastrophic. If in the longterm there are positive feedback mechanisms, or dangerous nonlinearities in the system (as some scientists suspect), this worry increases.
(p.36) Chapter 5 argues that we gain some insight into the shape of this intergenerational problem if we consider a pure version, where the generations do not overlap. 36 I call this "the central problem of intergenerational buck-passing" (CPIBP or "the central problem"), and think of it as the core concern of distinctively intergenerational ethics ("the pure intergenerational problem," or PIP). The main idea is that future generations are extremely vulnerable to their successors. They are subject to what we might call an ongoing "tyranny of the contemporary" that is parallel in some ways to the problem of the "tyranny of the majority" that exercises a great deal of traditional political theory.
It is useful to compare the pure intergenerational problem to the more traditional prisoner's dilemma or tragedy of the commons. The two have strong similarities. Suppose we envision a paradigm form of intergenerational buck-passing, a case where earlier generations inflict serious and unjustifiable pollution on later generations. On an optimistic understanding of things, this situation might involve the following claims about collective and individual rationality: 37 (PIP1) Almost every generation prefers the outcome produced by everyone restricting its pollution over the outcome produced by everyone overpolluting.
(PIP2) When each generation has the power to decide whether or not it will overpollute, each generation (rationally) prefers to do so, whatever the others do.
We might notice that PIP2, the claim about individual rationality, is structurally identical to PD2 in the prisoner's dilemma, and that PIP2, the claim about collective rationality, is also very similar to PD1. Still, even given this similarity, there are important differences. On the one hand, PIP1 is worse than PD1 because in intergenerational buck-passing not all of the actors prefer the cooperative outcome; instead, the first generation is left out, because it prefers noncooperation. (The cooperation of its successors does not benefit it; and since the costs of its overpollution are passed on to the future, holding back does not benefit it either, but requires a pure sacrifice.) Worse, because of this, there is a new problem (p.37) of defection. Since subsequent generations have no reason to comply if their predecessors do not, noncompliance by the first generation reverberates so as to undermine the collective project. If the first generation does not cooperate, then the second generation does not gain from cooperation, and so is put in the same position as the first. Hence, it does not cooperate, and so puts the third generation in the same position as the first; so, it does not cooperate, and so on. In short, the defection of the first generation is enough to unravel the entire scheme of cooperation.
On the other hand, the claim about individual rationality is worse in intergenerational buck-passing because the reason for it is deeper. Both claims about individual rationality hold because the parties lack access to mechanisms (such as enforceable sanctions) that would make defection unattractive. But whereas in normal tragedy of the commons cases this obstacle is largely practical, and can be resolved by the affected parties creating appropriate institutions together, in the pure intergenerational problem the parties do not coexist, and so the afflicted are in principle unable to directly influence the behavior of their predecessors.
This problem of interaction produces the second respect in which the pure intergenerational problem is worse than the tragedy of the commons. This is that it is more difficult to resolve, because the standard solutions to the tragedy of the commons are unavailable. One cannot appeal to a wider context of mutually beneficial interaction, nor to the usual notions of reciprocity. First, the appeal to broad self-interest relies on there being repeated interactions between the parties where mutually beneficial behavior is possible. But between present and future generations there is neither repeated interaction (by definition, there is no interaction at all), nor mutual benefit (there is no way for future generations to benefit present generations). 38 Second, in this context, an appeal to reciprocal fairness initially seems more promising. In particular, if one generation unilaterally restricts its pollution, then subsequent generations can owe the obligation to their forefathers to restrict theirs for the sake of future generations.
(Subsequent generations get a benefit from not inheriting an overpolluted planet, but then must, out of fairness, pass this on, so that there is a kind of indirect reciprocity.) However, one problem with this is (p.38) that we need to assume that the initial generation makes a pure sacrifice, with no compensation. So, their action cannot be justified by an appeal to (even indirect) reciprocity. 39 These problems reflect the difference in structure of the cases already mentioned. In the prisoner's dilemma case, most of the proposed solutions rely on rearranging the situation so as to provide some kind of guarantee of the behavior of others when one cooperates. But in the PIP, the situation cannot be rearranged in this way. 40 If the parties cannot interact, future generations are in no position to benefit or to engage in reciprocal acts with their forbears.
The upshot of all this is that the intergenerational analysis will be less optimistic about solutions than the prisoner's dilemma analysis. When applied to climate change, the intergenerational analysis suggests that current populations may not be motivated to establish a fully adequate global regime. Given the temporal dispersion of effects-and especially the substantial deferral and backloading of impacts-such a regime is probably neither in their interests nor responsive to their concerns (see chapter 2). 41 This is a significant moral problem. Moreover, since in my view the intergenerational storm dominates the global in climate change, the problem may become acute.
(p.39) 2. Exacerbating Factors
Intergenerational buck-passing is bad enough considered in isolation. But in the context of climate change it is also subject to morally relevant multiplier effects. First, climate change is not a static phenomenon. In failing to act appropriately, the current generation does not simply pass an existing problem along to future people. Instead, it adds to it, making the problem substantially worse. For one thing, it increases the costs of coping with climate change. Failing to act now increases the magnitude of future climate change and so its effects. For another, in failing to act now the current generation makes mitigation more difficult because it allows additional investment in fossil fuel-based infrastructure in developed and especially less developed countries. Hence, inaction raises transition costs, making future change harder than change now. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the current generation does not add to the problem in a linear way. Rather, it rapidly accelerates the problem, since global emissions are increasing at a substantial rate. For example, total carbon dioxide emissions have increased more than four-fold in the last fifty years: 42 In addition, global emissions have been growing even more rapidly in the recent past, from an average of 1.5-2% per annum in the late 1990s to nearly 3% in 2007. Though 2% may not seem like much, the effects of compounding make it significant, even in the near term: "continued growth of CO2 emissions at 2% per year would yield a 22% increase of emission rate in 10 years and a 35% increase in 15 years." 43 Moreover, the magnitude of the most recent growth is shocking. As the Washington Post put it late in 2008, "The rise in global carbon dioxide emissions last year outpaced international researchers' most dire projections." 44 The second multiplier effect is that insufficient action may make some generations suffer unnecessarily. Suppose that, at this point in time, climate change seriously affects the prospects of generations A, B, and C. Suppose, then, that if generation A refuses to act, the effect will continue for longer, harming generations D and E. This may make generation A's inaction worse in a significant respect. In addition to failing to aid generations B and C (and probably also increasing the magnitude of harm inflicted on them), generation A now harms generations D and E, who otherwise would be spared. On some views, this might count as especially egregious, since it might be said that it violates a fundamental moral principle of 'do no harm'. 45 The third multiplier effect is that generation A's inaction may create situations where tragic choices must be made. One way in which a generation may act badly is if it puts in place a set of future circumstances that make it morally required for its successors (and perhaps even itself) to make other generations suffer either unnecessarily, or at least more than would otherwise be the case. For example, suppose that (p.41) generation A could and should act now in order to limit climate change, and if it did so that generation D would be kept below some crucial climate threshold, but delay would mean that they would pass that threshold. 46 If passing the threshold imposes severe costs on generation D, then their situation may be so dire that they are forced to take action that will harm generation F (such as emitting even more greenhouse gases) than they would otherwise not need to consider. One possibility is this. Under some circumstances actions that harm innocent others may be morally permissible on grounds of self-defense, and such circumstances may arise in the climate change case. 47 In short, if there is a self-defense exception to the prohibition on harming innocent others, one way in which generation A might behave badly is by creating a situation such that generation D is forced to call on this exception, and so inflict extra suffering on generation F. 48 Worse, this problem can become iterated: perhaps generation D's actions force generation F to call on the selfdefense exception too, with the result that it inflicts harm on generation H, and so on.
(This is one instance of a more general scenario I refer to as the "intergenerational arms race" in chapter 6. See also chapters 10 and 11.)
IV. The Theoretical Storm
The final storm I want to highlight is constituted by our current theoretical ineptitude. We are extremely ill-equipped to deal with many problems characteristic of the long-term future. Even our best moral and political theories face fundamental and often severe difficulties addressing basic issues such as intergenerational equity, international justice, scientific uncertainty, contingent persons, and the human relationship to animals and nature more generally. But climate change involves all of these matters and more. Given this, our theories are poorly placed to respond. Theoretically, we are currently "inept," in the (nonpejorative) sense of lacking the skills and basic competence for the task. Cost-benefit analysis, when faced with uncertainties as big as these, would simply be self-deception. And in any case, it could not be a successful exercise, because the issue of our responsibility to future generations is too poorly understood, and too little accommodated in the current economic theory. 49 Unlike many concerned with environmental issues, Broome is a defender of CBA in normal contexts. 50 Nevertheless, he thinks that there are special problems in this setting that undermine its application (see chapter 8). Given such worries, we should be surprised at the continued predominance of economic analysis in policy discourse. Why indulge in "self-deception"? Unfortunately, other components of the perfect moral storm provide an answer. (See below.)
A second sign of our theoretical problems comes from the relative silence of most of the prominent political philosophies of the day on global environmental problems. 51 Of course, there is a feeling that such theories ought to have something to say about climate change. After all, such change is likely to be severely detrimental to concerns that they hold dear, such as happiness, individual rights, and the integrity of national cultures. Still, (p.43) A third sign of possible theoretical trouble comes from the fact that the global test is stated in purely anthropocentric terms, and instrumental ones at that. But surely a more general worry about the human exploitation of nature also lurks in the background.
To be sure, to a significant extent, the problem posed by the perfect moral storm is that nature becomes a vehicle through which injustice is visited on other people. It facilitates the exploitation of the poor by the rich in the global storm, and of the future by the present in the intergenerational storm. 52 Such injustice is made vivid even in narrowly instrumental terms. Environmental injustice impacts the wealth, health, and so on of vulnerable human beings.
Nevertheless, there may be more to consider if one thinks that nature may have noninstrumental value. To see this, consider an example. Many years ago, I came across a magazine article by an economist that argued that climate change is not a problem because future generations of humanity could always live in massive domes on the earth's surface if they needed to. 53 (Call this scenario dome world.) This claim is troubling for many reasons. But one that is especially striking is that it suggests that the disappearance of nonhuman animals and the rest of nature would not be a serious loss (or, at best, that it would be a compensable one). I take this to be a profound claim with which many people would disagree. On the one hand, many will object because they believe that a good relationship with the natural world is, or should be, constitutive of a flourishing human life. In that case, dome world involves another important manifestation of the global and intergenerational storms. On the other hand, some will insist that the dome world scenario is also morally horrifying because the loss of other living beings and systems on the planet would be a tragedy in itself, independently of its effects on human interests. This suggests a further, "ecological storm."
It is plausible to think that the structure of the distinctively ecological storm bears some similarity to the tragedy of the commons or intergenerational buck-passing models. Consider the following simple metaphor, (p.44) which I shall call kick the dog. In the old story, the farmer kicks his wife, his wife kicks the child, and the child kicks the dog. In the perfect moral storm, the parallel is likely to be that the current rich "kick" the current poor, and both "kick" future generations. But the "kicking" is unlikely to stop there. Chances are that many of the costs of our problematic ways of life will be passed on to other species through the ecological systems on which they depend. Some of this will be done directly by the rich, but some will also be done by the initial victims, the current poor and future generations. In other words, the initial bad behavior may set off a chain reaction towards the end of which stands not just the most vulnerable humans, but also many animals, plants, and places. Moreover, if and when the natural world kicks back, it The kick the dog scenario has strong initial plausibility. The signs are that such ecological buck-passing is already rife in the global environmental tragedy more generally. Humanity as such is kicking the atmosphere, the rainforests, the Arctic, and so on, and thorough them the polar bear, the big cats, and many other species. Much of this buckpassing is disguised by the complicated causal routes through which it occurs. But the fact that it is disguised does not mean that it is not happening.
What should we say about the status of the ecological storm? It is tempting to include it as one of the main constituents of the perfect moral storm proper, instead of subsuming it under the theoretical storm. I have not done so both for the sake of simplicity and because its existence as a distinct "storm" is itself a matter of theoretical controversy. This does not imply that it is not important or central. (I have not counted the problem of skewed vulnerabilities separately for similar reasons. Yet it is of profound importance.) Instead, it reflects my attempt, signaled in the Introduction, to beg as few theoretical questions as possible in the sketching of the basic moral problem. This does not in any way preclude those with strong ethical commitments to animals and the rest of nature from conceiving of the ecological storm as a distinct problem that should be addressed by any positive account that deserves our respect. (A similar point can be made about the problem of skewed vulnerabilities.) These are simply matters to be taken up elsewhere. 54
(p.45) V. The Problem of Moral Corruption
This brings us to the last problem I wish to identify. When the global, intergenerational and theoretical storms meet, they encourage a distinct problem for ethical action on climate change, the problem of moral corruption. This can be illustrated if we focus for a moment on the intergenerational storm. Acknowledging that one is engaging in intergenerational buck-passing is morally uncomfortable, especially when the consequences of such buck-passing may be severe, or even catastrophic, for the victims. Presumably, this is discomfort that we would like to avoid. Given this, if the current generation engages in buck-passing, it will welcome ways to obscure what it is doing. This is important because it suggests that climate policy is not made or discussed in a neutral evaluative context. The perfect moral storm clouds the debate.
One way to facilitate buck-passing is by avoiding real engagement with the issue. This might be achieved in a wide variety of ways, many of which are familiar from other contexts. Consider, for example:
• Distraction • Hypocrisy
Now, I suspect that close observers of two decades of political debate about climate change will recognize many of these mechanisms as being in play. In their most obvious forms, they facilitate a relatively quick evasion of the whole topic. But such strategies are also relevant to more substantive discussions.
Of special concern from an ethical and philosophical point of view is the fact that, if the current generation favors buck-passing, but does not want to face up to what it is doing, it is likely to welcome any rationale that appears to justify its behavior. Hence, it may be attracted to weak or deceptive arguments that appear to license buck-passing, and so give them less scrutiny than it ought. A particularly deep way of doing this is thorough the corruption of the very terms of the debate, moral and otherwise. In other words, the perfect moral storm may work to subvert our understanding of what is at stake.
(p.46) The idea that agents may subvert moral language and arguments for their own purposes is hardly unfamiliar in normal political life. Moreover, it is highly plausible to think that the self-serving approach to morality has been alive and well in much of what has passed for social and political discourse about climate change in the last twenty years or so. Still, the presence and prevalence of the intergenerational storm reveals a new and powerful potential for such trouble. In many normal contexts, the tendency towards the corruption of discourse faces a strong challenge from the likely victims of immoral behavior. But this is not the case in the intergenerational setting. Since the victims are not yet around to defend the discourse, the potential for moral corruption is especially high. 55 This problem is exacerbated by the iteration of buck-passing, which implies that when they are around, future people may themselves become vulnerable to moral corruption.
In chapter 9, I try to illustrate the problem more clearly by drawing a comparison between a classic instance of moral corruption in Jane Austen's Sense and Sensibility and the recent climate debate. For now, let me focus on just way in which moral corruption may be facilitated, by selective attention. Since climate change involves a complex convergence of problems, it is easy to engage in manipulative or self-deceptive behavior by applying one's attention to only some of the considerations that make the situation difficult. This may happen in a variety of ways.
At the level of practical politics, such strategies are all too familiar. For example, many political actors emphasize considerations that appear to make inaction excusable, or even desirable (such as uncertainty, or simple economic calculations with high discount rates) and action more difficult and contentious (such as the need for lifestyle change) at the expense of those that seem to impose a clearer and more immediate burden (such as scientific consensus and intergenerational buck-passing).
However, selective attention strategies may also manifest themselves more generally. In particular, perhaps it simply suits our buck-passing purposes to continue discussing climate change primarily in geopolitical terms, assuming that states represent the interests of their citizens in perpetuity. After all, the current generation may find such a framing highly advantageous. On the one hand, a focus on the global storm tends to draw attention towards various issues of global politics and scientific uncertainty (mentioned above) that seem to problematize action, and away from issues of intergenerational ethics, which tend to demand it. Thus, an emphasis on the global storm at the expense of the other problems may facilitate a strategy of procrastination and delay. On the other hand, since it usually stipulates that the relevant actors are nation-states who represent the interests of their citizens in perpetuity, the global storm analysis has the effect of assuming away the intergenerational aspect of the climate change problem. For one thing, it presumes that there is no motivation problem. It is just taken for granted that current governments and populations automatically take the interests of their successors into account, and to the appropriate extent. For another, it suggests that failure to act will result in a collectively self-inflicted harm (by those states to themselves), rather than in a potentially severe injustice to innocent and vulnerable others.
As the intergenerational analysis makes clear, these last claims are too quick. First, the current generation contributes significantly to climate change, but the effects will predominantly fall in the future, to other people (and species). Hence, the issue of how to understand and motivate appropriate moral concern, and especially intergenerational concern, is right at the heart of the climate problem. Second, these are not predominantly "self-inflicted" harms, but something significantly morally worse. This fact should also have motivational consequences. Given these points, an undue emphasis on the global storm obscures much of what is at stake in making climate policy, and in a way that benefits present people.
In conclusion, the threat of moral corruption reveals another sense in which climate change may be a "perfect" moral storm. Its complexity (p.48) may turn out to be perfectly convenient for us, the current generation, and indeed for each successor generation as it comes to occupy our position. For one thing, it provides each generation with the cover under which it can seem to be taking the issue seriously -by negotiating weak and largely substanceless global accords, for example, and then heralding them as great achievements (see chapters 3-4)-when really it is simply exploiting its temporal position. For another, all of this can occur without the exploiting generation actually having to acknowledge that this is what it is doing. If it can avoid the appearance of overtly selfish (or self-absorbed) behavior, an earlier generation can take advantage of the future without the unpleasantness of admitting it-either to others, or, perhaps more importantly, to itself.
Notes:
(1.) The IPCC is charged with providing member governments with state of the art The passage continues "to be determined through sociopolitical processes taking into account considerations such as development, equity, and sustainability, as well as uncertainties and risk." Hence, the IPCC takes a position on the way in which decisions will be made, and on some of the relevant criteria. These are themselves value judgments (albeit not highly controversial ones). But see also chapter 8. (11.) The term ' "perfect storm' " is in wide usage. However, it is difficult to find definitions. An online dictionary of slang offers the following: "When three events, usually beyond one's control, converge and create a large inconvenience for an individual. Each event represents one of the storms that collided on the Andrea Gail in the book/movie titled The Perfect Storm" (Urbandictionary.com, 3/25/05). More recently, Wikipedia states: "The phrase perfect storm refers to the simultaneous occurrence of events which, taken individually, would be far less powerful than the result of their chance combination. Such occurrences are rare by their very nature, so that even a slight change in any one event contributing to the perfect storm would lessen its overall impact" (Wikipedia, accessed 6/29/2007).
(12.) For example, Chrisoula Andreou draws our attention to the relevance of the psychological and philosophical literature on procrastination for understanding environmental decision making (Andreou 2006 (Andreou , 2007 (25.) Much more might be said here. I discuss some psychological aspects of political inertia and the role these play independently of scientific uncertainty in chapter 6.
(26.) This is because they tend to be located in warmer lower latitudes, because a greater proportion of their economies are in climate-sensitive sectors such as agriculture, and because-being poor-they are worse placed to deal with those impacts. (27.) Of course, it has not helped that over much of the last decade climate discussion has occurred in an unfortunate geopolitical setting. International negotiations have taken place against a backdrop of distraction, mistrust, and severe inequalities of power. For many years, the dominant global actor and lone superpower, the United States, refused to address climate change, and was distracted by the threat of global terrorism. Moreover, the international community, including many of America's historical allies, distrusted its motives, its actions, and especially its uses of moral rhetoric; so there was global discord. This unfortunate state of affairs was especially problematic in relation to the developing nations, whose cooperation must be secured if the climate change problem is to be addressed. One issue was the credibility of the developed nations' commitment to solving the climate change problem. (See the next section.) Another was the North's focus on mitigation to the exclusion of adaptation. A third concern was the South's fear of an "abate and switch" strategy on the part of the North. (Note that considered in isolation, these factors do not seem sufficient to explain political inertia. After all, the climate change problem originally became prominent during the 1990s, a decade with a much more promising geopolitical environment.) (33.) This is exacerbated by the fact that the climate is an inherently chaotic system in any case, and that there is no control against which its performance might be compared. (35.) Some may object to this assumption on the grounds that such benefits drive economic growth that does benefit future generations. This issue does complicate matters. Still, the assumptions (a) that economic growth will continue even in the face of catastrophic climate change, and (b) that it compensates for climate risks need to be scrutinized. See chapters 6 and 8.
(36.) Generational overlap complicates the picture in some ways, but I do not think that it resolves the basic problem. See Gardiner 2009a and chapter 5.
(37.) For the reasons for focusing on this form, see chapter 5.
(38.) Thus, the situation violates Axelrod's two conditions for resolution: there can be no reciprocity, and the future does not cast the relevant shadow over the parties. (55.) The same issue arises in the kick the dog scenario. The potential for moral corruption is also high in the global storm when the victims are contemporaries but spatially distant and relatively close to powerless.
